@article{ddd.uab.cat:142827,
      author = {Barberà, Salvador, and Massó, Jordi and Serizawa, Shigehiro},
       title = {Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges},
     journal = {Games and economic behavior},
        year = {1998},
      volume = {25},
      number = {2},
       pages = {272--291},
        note = {Altres ajuts: DGICYT/PB92-0590},
        note = {Altres ajuts: CIRIT/GRQ93-2044},
    abstract = {Strategy-proof social choice functions are characterized for
               societies where the space of alternatives is any full dimensional
               compact subset of a Euclidean space and all voters have
               generalized single-peaked preferences. Our results build upon and
               extend those obtained for cartesian product ranges by Border and
               Jordan (1983). By admitting a large set of non-cartesian ranges,
               we give a partial answer to the major open question left
               unresolved in this pioneering article. We prove that our class is
               composed by generalized median voter schemes which satisfy an
               additional condition, called the intersection property (Barberà,
               Massó, and Neme (1997).},
         doi = {10.1006/game.1997.0643},
         url = {https://ddd.uab.cat/record/142827},
}