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Página principal > Artículos > Artículos publicados > Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model |
Fecha: | 2003 |
Resumen: | In this note we introduce weak stability, a relaxation of the concept of stability for the marriage model by assuming that the agents are no longer myopic in choosing a blocking pair. The new concept is based on threats within blocking pairs: an individually rational matching is weakly stable if for every blocking pair one of the members can find a more attractive partner with whom he forms another blocking pair for the original matching. Our main result is that under the assumption of strict preferences, the set of weakly stable and weakly efficient matchings coincides with the bargaining set of Zhou (1994, Games Econ. Behav. 6, 512-526) for this context. |
Ayudas: | Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia DGES PB98-0870 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2000/SGR-00054 |
Derechos: | Tots els drets reservats. |
Lengua: | Anglès |
Documento: | Article ; recerca ; Versió sotmesa a revisió |
Materia: | Jocs, Teoria de ; Matching ; (Weak) stability ; Bargaining set |
Publicado en: | Games and economic behavior, Vol. 42 Núm. 1 (January 2003) , p. 91-100, ISSN 0899-8256 |
Preprint 13 p, 183.2 KB |