How complex are the contracts offered by health plans?
Olivella, Pau (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Vera-Hernández, Marcos (University College London)

Date:	2010
Abstract:	When health plans compete under adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium set of contracts is unique. However, the allocation of these contracts among health plans is undetermined. We show that three health plans suffice to sustain an equilibrium where each health plan offers a single contract and attracts a single type of agent (full specialization). We also show that this equilibrium can be ruled out by introducing any horizontal differentiation, and that if in equilibrium each health plan attracts all types of agents, at least one of the health plans must do so through a menu of contracts.
Grants:	Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2009-7616 Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación SEJ2006-00538 Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad CSD2006-16 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2009/SGR-169
Note:	Financial support by a Marie Curie Fellowship under contract no. HPMF-CT-01206. Olivella acknowledges financial support from projects SEJ2006-00538, ECO2009-7616, Consolider-Ingenio CSD2006-16, 2009SGR-169, and Barcelona Economics-Xarxa CREA. Olivella is a Research Fellow of MOVE (Markets, Organizations and Votes in Economics)
Rights:	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Subject:	Health plans competition ; Adverse selection ; Differentiation
Published in:	SERIEs, Vol. 1, Num. 3 (2010) , p. 305-323, ISSN 1869-4187

DOI: 10.1007/s13209-010-0026-3

19 p, 305.4 KB

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