Negotiation advantages of professional associations in health care
Barros, Pedro Pita (Universidade Nova de Lisboa)
Martínez Giralt, Xavier (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)

Date:	2005
Abstract:	In several instances, third-party payers negotiate prices of health care services with providers. We show that a third-party payer may prefer to deal with a professional association than with the sub-set constituted by the more efficient providers, and then apply the same price to all providers. The reason for this is the increase in the bargaining position of providers. The more efficient providers are also the ones with higher profits in the event of negotiation failure. This allows them to extract a higher surplus from the third-party payer.
Grants:	Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2001/SGR-00162 Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia BEC2003-01132
Note:	The financial support of Fundación BBVA, and projects SAPIENS grant 37762/01 (Pedro P. Barros) and 2001SGR-00162, and BEC2003-01132(Xavier Martinez-Giralt) is gratefully acknowledged.
Note:	Altres ajuts: SAPIENS/37762/01
Rights:	Tots els drets reservats.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió acceptada per publicar
Subject:	Professional associations ; Negotiation ; Health care
Published in:	International journal of health care finance and economics, Vol. 5 Núm. 2 (2005) , p. 191-204, ISSN 1389-6563

DOI: 10.1007/s10754-005-1867-3

Postprint 19 p, 207.6 KB

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