Comparing Voting by Committees According to their Manipulability
Arribillaga, R. Pablo (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Fecha:	2017
Resumen:	We consider the class of voting by committees to be used by a society to collectively choose a subset from a given set of objects. We offer a simple criterion to compare two voting by committees without dummy agents according to their manipulability. This criterion is based on the set-inclusion relationships between the two corresponding pairs of sets of objects, those at which each agent is decisive and those at which each agent is vetoer. We show that the binary relation "to be as manipulable as" endows the set of equivalence classes of anonymous voting by committees (i. e. , voting by quotas) with a complete upper semilattice structure, whose supremum is the equivalence class containing all voting by quotas with the property that the quota of each object is strictly larger than one and strictly lower than the number of agents. Finally, we extend the comparability criterion to the full class of all voting by committees.
Ayudas:	Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad SEV-2015-0563 Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2014-53051-P Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2014/SGR-515 Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte PR2015-00408
Nota:	Arribillaga acknowledges financial support received from the Universidad Nacional de San Luis, through Grant 319502, and from the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), through Grant PIP 112-200801-00655. Massó acknowledges financial support received from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and Grant ECO2014-53051-P, and from the Generalitat de Catalunya, through Grant SGR2014-515. The paper was partly written while Massó was visiting the Department of Economics at Stanford University. He wishes to acknowledge the hospitality of its members as well as financial support received from the Spanish Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, through Project PR2015-00408.
Nota:	Altres ajuts: UNSL/319502
Nota:	Altres ajuts: CONICET/PIP112-200801-00655
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Lengua:	Anglès
Documento:	Article ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Materia:	Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations ; Political Processes ; Rent-seeking ; Lobbying ; Elections ; Legislatures ; Voting Behavior
Publicado en:	American economic journal, Vol. 9, Núm. 4 (Novembre 2017) , ISSN 1945-7669

DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160107

34 p, 785.3 KB

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