Causality and Determinism : Tension, or Outright Conflict?
Hoefer, Carl (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament de Filosofia)

Date:	2004
Abstract:	In the philosophical tradition, the notions of determinism and causality are strongly linked: it is assumed that in a world of deterministic laws, causality may be said to reign supreme; and in any world where the causality is strong enough, determinism must hold. I will show that these alleged linkages are based on mistakes, and in fact get things almost completely wrong. In a deterministic world that is anything like ours, there is no room for genuine causation. Though there may be stable enough macro-level regularities to serve the purposes of human agents, the sense of "causality" that can be maintained is one that will at best satisfy Humeans and pragmatists, not causal fundamentalists.
Rights:	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Subject:	Causality ; Natural laws ; Determinism ; Nomic necessity
Published in:	Revista de filosofía (Madrid), Vol. 29 Núm. 2 (2004) , p. 99-115 (Artículos) , ISSN 1988-284X

Adreça alternativa: https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/view/RESF0404220099A

17 p, 81.1 KB

The record appears in these collections:
Articles > Research articles
Articles > Published articles