Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games : What do dictators believe other dictators do?
Iriberri, Nagore (Universidad del País Vasco)
Rey-Biel, Pedro (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Date:	2013
Abstract:	Using data from modified dictator games and a mixture-of-types estimation technique, we find a clear relationship between a classification of subjects into four different types of interdependent preferences (selfish, social welfare maximizers, inequity averse, and competitive) and the beliefs subjects hold about others' distributive choices in a nonstrategic environment. In particular, selfish individuals fall into false-consensus bias more than other types, as they can hardly conceive that other individuals incur costs so as to change the distribution of payoffs. We also find that selfish individuals are the most robust preference type when repeating play, both when they learn about others' previous choices (social information) and when they do not, while other preference types are more unstable. © 2013 Nagore Iriberri and Pedro Rey-Biel.
Grants:	Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación ECO2011-25295 Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2012-31626 Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2012-31962 Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología ECO2009-07616 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2009/SGR-169
Rights:	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Subject:	Belief elicitation ; C72 ; C91 ; D81 ; Experiments ; Inequity aversion ; Interdependent preferences ; Mixture-of-types models ; Social information ; Social welfare maximizing
Published in:	Quantitative Economics, Vol. 4 Núm. 3 (november 2013) , p. 515-547, ISSN 1759-7331

DOI: 10.3982/QE135

33 p, 278.9 KB

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