Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
Alcalde, José (Universitat d'Alacant)
Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
Romero Medina, Antonio (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

Date:	1998
Abstract:	We implement the stable correspondence of a job matching market in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. We use a simple sequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (first stage) and, then, each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). Moreover, if agents' preferences are additive, this mechanism implements in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium the firms' optimal correspondence when firms use undominated strategies. Finally, we construct another simple sequential mechanism where the order of decisions is permuted and which implements the workers' optimal correspondence when agents' preferences are additive.
Note:	Altres ajuts: DGCYT/PB 92-0590
Note:	Altres ajuts: DGCYT/PB 94-1504
Rights:	Tots els drets reservats.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió acceptada per publicar
Published in:	Journal of economic theory, Vol. 82 Núm. 2 (octubre 1998) , p. 469-480, ISSN 1095-7235

DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2447

Postprint 13 p, 280.7 KB

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