Farsighted house allocation
Klaus, Bettina (Harvard Business School)
Klijn, Flip (Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica)
Walzl, Markus (Bamberg University)
Harvard Business School

Date:	2010
Description:	11 pag.
Abstract:	In this note we study von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for Shapley and Scarf (1974) housing markets. Kawasaki (2008) shows that the set of competitive allocations coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of antisymmetric weak dominance (cf. , Wako, 1999). We demonstrate that the set of competitive allocations also coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of strong dominance (cf. , Roth and Postlewaite, 1977) if no individual is indifferent between his endowment and the endowment of someone else.
Grants:	Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación ECO2008-04784 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2005/SGR-00626
Note:	Altres ajuts: VIDI-452-06-013
Note:	Altres ajuts: CONSOLIDER-INGENIO/CSD2006-00016
Rights:	Aquest material està protegit per drets d'autor i/o drets afins. Podeu utilitzar aquest material en funció del que permet la legislació de drets d'autor i drets afins d'aplicació al vostre cas. Per a d'altres usos heu d'obtenir permís del(s) titular(s) de drets.
Language:	Anglès
Series:	Working Paper (Harvard Business School) ; 09-129
Document:	Working paper
Subject:	Housing markets ; Indivisible goods ; Farsightedness ; Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets ; Top trading cycles ; Competitive allocations

11 p, 201.5 KB

The record appears in these collections:
Research literature > Working papers