Competing principals and non-vote decisions in the European Parliament
Font, Nuria (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament de Ciència Política i de Dret Públic)

Date:	2020
Abstract:	This article analyses the effects of competing principals on legislators' decisions not to vote in the European Parliament. We argue that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are likely to decide not to vote to avoid defecting from either the national party or the European political group when both political principals disagree. Moreover, the article demonstrates that competing demands between principals interact with the expected closeness of a vote. MEPs are more likely to opt for not voting when they have few chances to influence the vote outcome and are torn between the two main principals. Based on a novel data set on individual votes in the 2009-2014 term, this article demonstrates that competing demands moderate the effect of the expected vote closeness on non-vote decisions and highlights the need to incorporate this type of legislative non-response in future research.
Grants:	Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad CSO2015-66050-P
Rights:	Aquest material està protegit per drets d'autor i/o drets afins. Podeu utilitzar aquest material en funció del que permet la legislació de drets d'autor i drets afins d'aplicació al vostre cas. Per a d'altres usos heu d'obtenir permís del(s) titular(s) de drets.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió acceptada per publicar
Published in:	Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 73 Núm. 1 (january 2020) , p. 166-185, ISSN 1460-2482
Related work:	Font Borrás, Nuria, 2024, "Replication data for: "Competing principals and non-vote decisions in the European Parliament"" CORA.Repositori de Dades de Recerca https://doi.org/10.34810/data1544

DOI: 10.1093/pa/gsy043

Postprint 31 p, 362.8 KB

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