Informal rules and institutional balances on the boards of EU agencies
Font, Nuria (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament de Ciència Política i de Dret Públic)

Date:	2018
Abstract:	Recent research has paid increasing attention to the institutional dynamics of EU agencies in post-delegation but has barely explored the conditions under which patterns of informality shifting institutional power balances are likely to emerge on agency boards. Based on documentary analysis and 60 semi-structured interviews covering 22 agencies, this article examines under what conditions boards' formal configurations in which the Member States hold a majority are informally altered to the advantage of the Commission. The article argues that functional motivations are present in the emergence of informal rules empowering the Commission, but those rationales are conditional to distributional considerations.
Grants:	Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad CSO2012-31443
Rights:	Aquest material està protegit per drets d'autor i/o drets afins. Podeu utilitzar aquest material en funció del que permet la legislació de drets d'autor i drets afins d'aplicació al vostre cas. Per a d'altres usos heu d'obtenir permís del(s) titular(s) de drets.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió acceptada per publicar
Subject:	Informal rules ; Agencies ; European Union ; Management boards
Published in:	Administration & society, Vol. 50 Núm. 2 (January 2018) , p. 269-294, ISSN 1552-3039

DOI: 10.1177/0095399715588782

Postprint 33 p, 493.5 KB

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