Drought-Reliefs and Partisanship
Boffa, Federico (Free University of Bolzano)
Cavalcanti, Francisco (Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro)
Fons-Rosen, Christian (University of California at Merced)
Piolatto, Amedeo. (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Date:	2023
Abstract:	We combine a model of symmetric information with selfish and office-motivated politicians and an Regression Discontinuity Design analysis based on close municipal elections to study partisan bias in the allocation of drought aid relief in Brazil. We identify a novel pattern of distributive politics whereby partisan bias materializes only before municipal elections, while it disappears before presidential elections. Furthermore, before mayoral elections, it fades for extreme (high or low) aridity levels while persisting for moderate levels. Our empirical results show that in this case alignment increases the probability of receiving aid relief by a factor of two (equivalent to 18. 1 percentage points).
Grants:	Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad RYC-2016-19371 Agencia Estatal de Investigación CEX2019-000915-S
Note:	Altres ajuts: acords transformatius de la UAB
Rights:	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Published in:	Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 86, núm. 2 (April 2024) , p. 187-208, ISSN 1468-0084

DOI: 10.1111/obes.12560

22 p, 531.5 KB

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