A theorem on preference aggregation
Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.)
Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica

Publicació:	CREA-Barcelona Economics, 2003
Resum:	I present a general theorem on preference aggregation. This theorem implies, as corollaries, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, Wilson's extension of Arrow's to non-Paretian aggregation rules, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem and Sen's result on the Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal. The theorem shows that these classical results are not only similar, but actually share a common root. The theorem expresses a simple but deep fact that transcends each of its particular applications: it expresses the tension between decentralizing the choice of aggregate into partial choices based on preferences over pairs of alternatives, and the need for some coordination in these decisions, so as to avoid contradictory recommendations.
Ajuts:	Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte PB98-0870 Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología BEC2002-002130 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2001-SGR-00162
Drets:	Tots els drets reservats.
Llengua:	Anglès
Col·lecció:	Barcelona Economics Working Paper Series 166
Document:	Working paper ; recerca ; Versió de l'autor

19 p, 394.5 KB

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