@article{ddd.uab.cat:284696,
      author = {Barberà, Salvador and Gerber, Anke},
       title = {Deciding on what to decide},
     journal = {International Economic Review},
        year = {2022},
      volume = {63},
      number = {1},
       pages = {37--61},
        note = {Altres ajuts: Anke Gerber acknowledges financial support by MOVE
               for a research stay at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.},
    abstract = {We study two-stage collective decision-making procedures where
               in the first stage, part of the voters decide what issues will be
               put in the agenda and in the second stage, the whole set of
               voters decides on the positions to be adopted regarding the
               issues that are in the agenda. Using a protocol-free equilibrium
               concept, we show that essentially any set of issues can be
               obtained as an equilibrium agenda under two salient classes of
               voting procedures. Moreover, the chair may manipulate a
               sequential voting rule such that certain issues do not get to the
               floor.},
         doi = {10.1111/iere.12542},
         url = {https://ddd.uab.cat/record/284696},
}