On the rule of k names
Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Coelho, Danilo (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica

Imprint:	Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2007
Description:	39 pàg.
Abstract:	The rule of k names can be described as follows: given a set of candidates for office, a committee chooses k members from this set by voting, and makes a list with their names. Then a single individual from outside the committee selects one of the listed names for the office. Different variants of this method have been used since the distant past and are still used today in many countries and for different types of choices. After documenting this widespread use by means of actual examples, we provide a game theoretical analysis. We concentrate on the plausible outcomes induced by the rule of k names when the agents involved act strategically. Our analysis shows how the parameter k, the screening rule and the nature of candidacies act as a means to balance the power of the committee with that of the chooser.
Grants:	Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia SEJ2006-27589-E Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación ECO2008-04756
Rights:	Aquest material està protegit per drets d'autor i/o drets afins. Podeu utilitzar aquest material en funció del que permet la legislació de drets d'autor i drets afins d'aplicació al vostre cas. Per a d'altres usos heu d'obtenir permís del(s) titular(s) de drets.
Language:	Anglès
Series:	BSE working paper ; 264
Document:	Working paper ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Subject:	Constitutional design ; Rule of three names ; Screening candidates ; Strong Nash equilibrium ; Voting rules
Published in:	BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2004

Adreça alternativa: https://bse.eu/research/working-papers/rule-k-names

39 p, 256.9 KB

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Research literature > Working papers