Still standing for elections? Political externalities and the determinants of party entry decisions
Guinjoan, Marc (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament de Ciència Política i de Dret Públic)

Data:	2024
Descripció:	28 pàg.
Resum:	According to the Duvergerian theories, only political parties expecting to achieve representation are predicted to stand for elections alone in the long run. However, the empirical evidence shows that throughout the world parties continue presenting candidacies when they are non-viable, thus calling into question Duverger. Developing from this apparent paradox, I argue that the overlap of electoral arenas generates two fundamental opportunities for parties to compete. Through in-depth interviews with political leaders in Canada and Spain, I show that parties take advantage of the existence of economies of scale to present candidacies in non-viable arenas and, most relevant, by presenting candidacies where they are not expecting to become viable they obtain political externalities. Overall, the overlap of electoral arenas turns the decision to present candidacies when non-viable into the dominant strategy, whereas coalescing or withdrawing become least favoured alternatives.
Drets:	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades.
Llengua:	Anglès
Document:	Prepublicació ; recerca ; Versió de l'autor
Matèria:	Economies of scale ; Duverger ; Asymmetric viability ; Overlap of arenas ; Externalities

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