Search and matching in the labor market without unemployment insurance
Obiols Homs, Francesc (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Imprint:	Barcelona: GSE Working Paper; 2018
Abstract:	I study the effect of the market arrangement on competitive allocations in a model in which the distribution of idiosyncratic uncertainty is determined endogenously. The particular application I consider is a search model of the labor market embedded in a general equilibrium model with production and asset accumulation. It is shown that costly search with incomplete markets introduces a wealth effect at low levels of wealth such that poor agents do not search much or even find optimal not to look for a job. The combination of this effect with the usual one at higher wealth levels delivers equilibrium allocations that are remarkably different from the one that obtains under complete markets. I also use numerical methods to obtain quantitative predictions in a calibrated version of the model. The effect of the market arrangement remains dramatically large due to search externalities.
Grants:	Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2015-67602 Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2012-32392 Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad SEV-2015-0563
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Language:	Anglès
Series:	GSE working paper ; 670
Document:	Working paper ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Subject:	Search ; Incomplete markets ; General equilibrium
Published in:	GSE Barcelona Graduate School of Economics Working Papers, Nº 670 (2018)

Adreça alternativa: https://bse.eu/research/working-papers/search-and-matching-labor-market-without-unemployment-insurance

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