Discrimination strategies : a case study for credit contracts
Artige, Lionel (Université de Liège)
Nicolini, Rosella (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Date:	2012
Description:	24 pàg.
Grants:	Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2009/SGR-00600 Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad SEJ2008-01850
Note:	The objective of this paper is to focus on the Önancing strategy adopted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in the period 1991-2003. We propose a simple empirical method to isolate the most e§ective screening device for contracts granted under conditions of asymmetric information. In line with the predictions of the contract theory, the role of memory is dominant. By exploiting the information about the number and type of contracts by client, we test di§erent indicators to approximate the clientís reputation. Our results unambiguously isolate the dominant e§ect of the value of of the Örst investment project Önanced by the EBRD as the most e§ective screening device among the established clients.
Note:	R. Nicolini's research was supported by Ramón y Cajal and by Barcelona GSE Research Network. Financial support from research grants 2009SGR00600 and SEJ2008-01850 is acknowledged.
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Language:	Anglès
Document:	Prepublicació ; recerca ; Versió de l'autor
Subject:	Fixed-effect technique ; Financial contracts ; Screening devices

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2113379

31 p, 288.1 KB

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