On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
Bonifacio, Agustín G. (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Imprint:	Barcelona: GSE Working Papers, 2019
Abstract:	We study social choice rules defined on the domain of semilattice singlepeaked preferences. Semilattice single-peakedness has been identified as the necessary condition that a set of preferences must satisfy so that the set can be the domain of a strategy-proof, tops-only, anonymous and unanimous rule. We characterize the class of all such rules on that domain and show that they are deeply related to the supremum of the underlying semilattice structure.
Grants:	Agencia Estatal de Investigación ECO2017-83534-P Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad SEV-2015-0563 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca SGR / 2017-711
Note:	Altres ajuts: Universidad Nacional de San Luis, mitjançant subvenció 319502 ; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas PIP 112-200801-00655
Rights:	Tots els drets reservats.
Language:	Anglès
Series:	GSE working paper; 1087
Document:	Working paper ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Subject:	Strategy-proofness ; Unanimity ; Anonymity ; Tops-onlyness ; Single-peakedness
Published in:	Barcelona Graduate School of Economics Working Papers, 2019

Adreça alternativa: https://bse.eu/research/working-papers/strategy-proofness-and-semilattice-single-peakedness

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