Home > Research literature > Working papers > On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness |
Imprint: | Barcelona: Barcelona Graduate School of Economics; 2015 |
Abstract: | We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich domain of preference pro les. We show that if the social choice function satis es in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). We do so by deriving from the social choice function an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the notion of a semilattice single-peaked preference can be de ned. We also provide a converse of this main nding. Finally, we show how well-known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy-proof social choice functions are admissible are semilattice single-peaked domains. |
Grants: | Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación SEV-2011-0075 Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2008-0475-FEDER Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca SGR / 2014-515 |
Note: | Altres ajuts: Singapore Management University, mitjançant subvenció C244/MSS13E001 |
Rights: | Tots els drets reservats. |
Language: | Anglès |
Series: | Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series; 828 |
Document: | Working paper ; recerca ; Versió publicada |
Subject: | Strategy-proofness ; Single-peakedness ; Anonymity ; Unanimity ; Tops-onlyness ; Semilattice |
Published in: | GSE Barcelona Graduate School of Economics Working Papers, 2015 |
31 p, 363.5 KB |