Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
Arribillaga, R. Pablo (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Imprint:	Barcelona: GSE Working Papers; 2014
Abstract:	We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. We perform a specific analysis of all median voter schemes: the anonymous subfamily of generalized median voter schemes.
Grants:	Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación SEV-2011-0075 Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2008-0475-FEDER Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca SGR-2009/0419
Note:	Altres ajuts: Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas PIP 112-200801-00655
Note:	Altres ajuts: Universidad Nacional de San Luis mitjançant subvenció 319502
Rights:	Tots els drets reservats.
Language:	Anglès
Series:	GSE working paper; 753
Document:	Working paper ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Subject:	Anonymity ; Generalized median voting schemes ; Strategy-proofness
Published in:	Barcelona Graduate School of Economics Working Papers, 2014

Adreça alternativa: https://bse.eu/research/working-papers/comparing-generalized-median-voter-schemes-according-their-manipulability

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