All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof
Arribillaga, R. Pablo (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)

Imprint:	Barcelona: Barcelona Graduate School of Economics 2019
Abstract:	For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, efficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
Grants:	Agencia Estatal de Investigación ECO2017-83534-P Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad SEV-2015-0563 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca SGR / 2017-711
Note:	Altres ajuts: Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas PIP 112-200801-00655
Note:	Altres ajuts: Universidad Nacional de San Luis mitjançant subvenció 032016
Rights:	Tots els drets reservats.
Language:	Anglès
Series:	Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series ; 1108
Document:	Working paper ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Subject:	Obvious Strategy-proofness ; Sequential Allotment Rules ; Division Problem ; Single-peaked Preferences
Published in:	GSE Barcelona Graduate School of Economics Working Papers, 2019

Adreça alternativa: https://bse.eu/research/working-papers/all-sequential-allotment-rules-are-obviously-strategy-proof

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