Solicited versus unsolicited ratings : the role of selection
Gibert Rivas, Anna (German Institute of Economic Research (DIW))

Imprint:	BAFFI CAREFIN Centre Research Paper; 2018
Description:	42 pàg.
Abstract:	This paper analyses the extent to which selection explains the observed discrepancy between solicited and unsolicited ratings. I propose a model of selection with truth telling rating agencies and borrowers with the ability to veto the revelation of the rating. The observed difference between the two categories of ratings in different markets is in line with the prediction of the model. In the financial sector, for example, selection of less creditworthy borrowers into unsolicited status makes unsolicited ratings grades lower on average than those solicited. In the government sector, on the other hand, there is a positive selection of borrowers into unsolicited ratings.
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Language:	Anglès
Document:	Working paper ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Subject:	Unsolicited ratings ; Ancillary services ; Sovereign debt ; Rating Agencies

Adreça alternativa: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3102833
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3102833

42 p, 472.0 KB

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Research literature > Working papers