A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games
Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Department of Economics and Economic History. Center for the study of the Organizations and Decisions in Economics (CODE). Research Group Coalitions, Incentives, and Networks in Collective Choices)
Gerber, Anke (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Date:	2007
Abstract:	We show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as "resting points" in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.
Rights:	Aquesta url de drets no existeix a la base de dades.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Working paper ; Versió definida a EGRETA: publishersversion
Subject:	Coalition formation ; Hedonic game ; Stability
Published in:	Economics letters, Vol. 95, Num. 1 (2007) , p. 85-90, ISSN 0165-1765

Adreça original del document, elimineu-la del registre: https://egreta.uab.cat/ws/files/410425828/2007_SB_AG_A_note_EcLetters.pdf
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.09.018

6 p, 142.2 KB

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