Intermediate condorcet winners and losers
Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
Bossert, Walter (University of Montreal)

Imprint:	Barcelona : Barcelona School of Economics, 2024
Abstract:	The conditions of strong Condorcet winner consistency and strong Condorcet loser consistency are, in essence, universally accepted as attractive criteria to evaluate the performance of social choice functions. However, there are many situations in which these conditions are silent because such winners and losers may not exist. Hence, weakening these desiderata in order to extend the domain of profiles where they apply is an appealing task. Yet, the often-proposed and accepted weak counterparts of these properties suffer from the shortcoming that a weak Condorcet winner can be a weak Condorcet loser at the same time, thus leading to contradictory recommendations regarding their use as normative criteria. After presenting evidence that this anomaly is pervasive, even in the presence of substantial and important domain restrictions, we propose new notions of Condorcet-type winners and losers that are between these two extremes: they share the intuitive appeal of strong Condorcet winner consistency and strong Condorcet loser consistency and avoid the contradictory recommendations that would derive from the double identification of candidates as being weak Condorcet winners and losers at the same time. We prove that abiding to the new principles is compatible with various additional attractive normative criteria. Finally, we propose a class of social choice functions that are consistent with the recommendations of our new proposals and can be extended to the universal domain through the lexicographical use of complementary choice criteria, in the spirit of previous proposals by noted authors like Pierre Daunou and Duncan Black.
Grants:	Agencia Estatal de Investigación CEX2019-000915-S Agencia Estatal de Investigación PID2020-116771GB-I00 Generalitat de Catalunya 2021 / SGR-00194
Note:	A portada: January 2023 (Revised: March 2024)
Rights:	Aquest material està protegit per drets d'autor i/o drets afins. Podeu utilitzar aquest material en funció del que permet la legislació de drets d'autor i drets afins d'aplicació al vostre cas. Per a d'altres usos heu d'obtenir permís del(s) titular(s) de drets.
Language:	Anglès
Series:	BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers ; 1380
Document:	Working paper ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Subject:	Voting ; Social Choice ; Single-peakedness, ; Condorcet consistency

26 p, 238.8 KB

The record appears in these collections:
Research literature > Working papers