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26 p, 329.1 KB A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. [...]
2004 - 10.1007/s00355-003-0245-7
Social choice and welfare, Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (October 2004) , p. 187-206  

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