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| Home > Research literature > Working papers > Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability |
| Home > Research literature > Working papers > Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability |
| Imprint: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2014 |
| Description: | 44 p. |
| Abstract: | We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three nec- essary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilat- erally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. We perform a specific analysis of all median voter schemes, the anonymous subfamily of generalized median voter schemes. |
| Rights: | L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons:  |
| Language: | Anglès |
| Series: | Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica / Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). Working papers |
| Series: | Working papers ; 946.14 |
| Document: | Working paper |
| Subject: | Generalized Median Voting Schemes ; Strategy-proofness ; Anonymity ; Vot -- Models matemàtics |
