Robust design in monotonic matching markets : a case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance
Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal)
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Imprint:	Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative (CIREQ) 2018
Description:	24 pag.
Abstract:	We study two-sided matching markets among workers and firms. Workers seek one position at a firm but firms may employ several workers. In many applications those markets are monotonic: leaving positions unfilled is costly as for instance, for hospitals this means not being able to provide full service to its patients. A huge literature has advocated the use of stable mechanisms for clearinghouses. The interests among workers and firms are polarized among stable mechanisms, most famously the firm-proposing DA and the worker-proposing DA. We show that for the firmproposing DA ex-ante incentive compatibility and ex-post incentive compatibility are equivalent whereas this is not necessarily true for the worker-proposing DA. The firm-proposing DA turns out to be more robust than the worker-proposing DA under incomplete information when incentives of both sides of the market are important.
Grants:	Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2017-83534-P Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad SEV-2015-0563 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2014/SGR-515
Rights:	Tots els drets reservats.
Language:	Anglès
Series:	Cahiers de recherche ; 04-2018
Document:	Working paper
Subject:	Many-to-one matching market ; Stability ; Incomplete information ; Monotonic responsive extensions ; Robust mechanism design

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24 p, 524.5 KB

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