Home > Search Results: Ehlers, Lars
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Results overview: Found 8 records in 0.02 seconds.
Articles, 2 records found
Research literature, 6 records found
Articles 2 records found  
1.
35 p, 428.9 KB Matching Markets under (In)complete Information / Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
We introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about the other agents' true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). [...]
2015 - 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.008
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 157 (2015) , p. 295-314  
Detailed record -
2.
27 p, 240.7 KB Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets / Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal. Département de Sciences Économiques.) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
We study ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truthtelling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. [...]
2007 - 10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.007
Journal of economic theory, Núm. 136 (2007) , p. 587-600  
Detailed record -

Research literature 6 records found  
1.
19 p, 179.2 KB Free triples, large indifference vlasses and the majority rule / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica
We study classes of voting situations where agents may exhibit a systematic inability to distinguish between the elements of certain sets of alternatives. These sets of alternatives may differ from voter to voter, thus resulting in personalized families of preferences. [...]
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2007 (BSE working paper ; 15)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2007  
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2.
24 p, 524.5 KB Robust design in monotonic matching markets : a case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance / Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
We study two-sided matching markets among workers and firms. Workers seek one position at a firm but firms may employ several workers. In many applications those markets are monotonic: leaving positions unfilled is costly as for instance, for hospitals this means not being able to provide full service to its patients. [...]
Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative (CIREQ) 2018 (Cahiers de recherche ; 04-2018)  
Detailed record -
3.
23 p, 238.7 KB Incomplete information and small cores in matching markets / Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal.Département de Sciences Économiques and CIREQ) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica
We study Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. [...]
[S.l.] : Centre de Referencia en Economia Analítica, 2004 (Barcelona economics working papers series; 147)  
Detailed record -
4.
15 p, 224.9 KB Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- ; Ehlers, Lars ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We present a new domain of preferences under which the majority relation is always quasi-transitive and thus Condorcet winners always exist. We model situations where a set of individuals must choose one individual in the group. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 512.02)  
Detailed record - Creative Commons
5.
12 p, 204.7 KB Efficient priority rules / Ehlers, Lars ; Klaus, Bettina ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 554.02)  
Detailed record - Creative Commons
6.
20 p, 236.4 KB Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems / Ehlers, Lars ; Klaus, Bettina ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e. g. , houses, jobs, offices, etc. ) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. [...]
2006 (Working papers ; 566.03)  
Detailed record - Creative Commons

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