Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona)
Moreno, Bernardo (Campus de El Ejido)
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Consorci Markets, Organizacions and Votes in Economics (MOVE)

Date:	2020
Description:	28 pàg.
Abstract:	We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold for mechanisms with two alternatives in the range. For partially knit and strict environments, we prove that ex post incentive compatibility extends to groups, and that strategy-proofness implies strong group strategy-proofness in the special case of private values. The results extend to mechanisms operating on non-strict domains under an additional requirement of respectfulness. We discuss examples of environments where our theorems apply.
Grants:	Agencia Estatal de Investigación ECO2017-83534-P Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación SEV-2015-0563 Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad ECO2016-76255-P Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad ECO2017-86245-P Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2017-SGR-0711
Rights:	Tots els drets reservats.
Language:	Anglès
Series:	BSE working paper ; 1024
Document:	Working paper ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Subject:	Allocation problems ; Ex post incentive compatibility ; Interdependent types ; Jury decisions ; Mechanisms ; Pareto efficiency ; Preference functions ; Strategy-proofness
Published in:	BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2020

Adreça alternativa: https://bse.eu/research/working-papers/restricted-environments-and-incentive-compatibility-interdependent-values

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