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Pàgina inicial > Documents de recerca > Working papers > Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models |
Data: | 2020 |
Descripció: | 28 pàg. |
Resum: | We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold for mechanisms with two alternatives in the range. For partially knit and strict environments, we prove that ex post incentive compatibility extends to groups, and that strategy-proofness implies strong group strategy-proofness in the special case of private values. The results extend to mechanisms operating on non-strict domains under an additional requirement of respectfulness. We discuss examples of environments where our theorems apply. |
Ajuts: | Agencia Estatal de Investigación ECO2017-83534-P Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación SEV-2015-0563 Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad ECO2016-76255-P Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad ECO2017-86245-P Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2017-SGR-0711 |
Drets: | Tots els drets reservats. |
Llengua: | Anglès |
Col·lecció: | BSE working paper ; 1024 |
Document: | Working paper ; recerca ; Versió publicada |
Matèria: | Allocation problems ; Ex post incentive compatibility ; Interdependent types ; Jury decisions ; Mechanisms ; Pareto efficiency ; Preference functions ; Strategy-proofness |
Publicat a: | BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2020 |
44 p, 565.3 KB |