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Resultats globals: 4 registres trobats en 0.03 segons.
Articles, 3 registres trobats
Documents de recerca, 1 registres trobats
Articles 3 registres trobats  
1.
34 p, 226.8 KB La Crema : a case study of mutual fire insurance / Cabrales, Antonio 1964- (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) ; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Jackson, Matthew O. (California Institute of Technology (Estats Units d'Amèrica))
We analyze a mutual fire insurance mechanism used in Andorra, which is called La Crema in the local language. This mechanism relies on households' announced property values to determine how much a household is reimbursed in the case of a fire and how payments are apportioned among other households. [...]
honestly report the true value of their property. However, such honest reporting is not an equilibrium except in the extreme case in which the property values are identical for all households. Nevertheless, as the size of the society becomes large, the benefits from deviating from truthful reporting vanish, and all the nondegenerate equilibria of the mechanism are nearly truthful and approximately Pareto efficient.
2003 - 10.1086/367680
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 111 Núm. 2 (2003) , p. 425-458  
Registre complet -
2.
20 p, 607.8 KB Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information / Clippel, Geoffroy de (Brown University) ; Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Wettstein, David (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)
We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were un-der complete information. [...]
2012 - 10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.005
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 75, Num. 1 (2012) , p. 413-423  
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3.
19 p, 213.5 KB Bribe-proof rules in the division problem / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. [...]
2007 - 10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.006
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 61 Núm. 2 (November 2007) , p. 331-343  
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Documents de recerca 1 registres trobats  
1.
44 p, 565.3 KB Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona) ; Moreno, Bernardo (Campus de El Ejido) ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Consorci Markets, Organizacions and Votes in Economics (MOVE)
We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold for mechanisms with two alternatives in the range. [...]
2020 (BSE working paper ; 1024)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2020  
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