Home > Articles > Published articles > On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness |
Date: | 2020 |
Description: | 34 pàg. |
Abstract: | We characterize the set of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Since obvious strategy-proofness implies strategy-proofness, and the set of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on this domain coincides with the class of generalized median voter schemes, we focus on this class. We identify a condition on generalized median voter schemes for which the following characterization holds. A generalized median voter scheme is obviously strategy-proof if and only if it satisfies the increasing intersection property. Our proof is constructive; for each generalized median voter scheme that satisfies the increasing intersection property we define an extensive game form that implements it in obviously dominant strategies. |
Grants: | Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2017-83534-P Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad SEV-2015-0563 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca SGR2017-711 |
Note: | Altres ajuts: UNSL (032016) ; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET) (PIP 112-201501-005055) ; Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica y Tecnológica (PICT 2017-2355) |
Rights: | Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades. |
Language: | Anglès |
Document: | Article ; recerca ; Versió acceptada per publicar |
Subject: | Obvious strategy-proofness ; Generalized median voters ; Single-peakedness |
Published in: | Journal of economic theory, Vol. 186 (2020) , p. 104992, ISSN 1095-7235 |
Postprint 41 p, 433.1 KB |