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All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy-proof
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Arribillaga, R. Pablo (Universidad Nacional de San Luis) ;
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ;
Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, efficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. [...]
Barcelona: Barcelona Graduate School of Economics 2019 (Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series ; 1108)
GSE Barcelona Graduate School of Economics Working Papers, 2019
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