Xavier Rambla Sociologia

Catalan and Spanish versions available here and here

At the same time as many countries engage in controversies on school choice, educational public- private partnerships and the corresponding legal reforms, a number of specialists are studying the effects of the co-existence of two different institutional sectors funded by public budgets, namely public and private-dependent schools. Actually, Spain and Chile provide two very relevant cases to find these effects out, because in these two countries a great share of students enrols in private schools supported by state aid (i.e. private-dependent schools).

Really, many research questions are at stake. Do these institutional arrangements eventually broaden the scope for family choice? Do private dependent schools charge a fee, besides the public benefit they receive? Do these schools select their intake? Which effects do fees and selection provoke? Does the co-existence of these two types of schools trigger competence to improve teaching and academic performance? Is it connected with the increasing segregation observed almost everywhere? Actually, private dependent schools charge fees in some countries, although in other ones they don’t; furthermore, in some countries they establish their own criteria for student admission while this option is completely forbidden in other ones. Their effects on academic quality vary significantly, in both ways, and anyway they are not the only cause of school segregation.

A research team has compared the politics of private dependent schools in Spain and Chile. We asked for similarities and differences beyond statistics and law. Our conclusion highlights that the main variation is quantitative, since inequalities and segregation are sharper in Chile but the same underlying processes can be observed in both cases. First, in both countries the democratic governments elected during the political transitions from authoritarian rule attempted to regulate the private-dependent sector, which the dictatorships had widely supported. Second, in Spain and Chile important campaigns have been launched by different political players both for and against a stricter regulation of this sector. Third, our observation of local politics in both countries shows that private-dependent schools avail of influential (formal and informal) political instruments so that their interests eventually prevail, mostly as far as the selection of students is concerned.

In our view, this analysis also highlights two questions that political debates often overlook. Certainly, the waves of reforms and mobilisation have been so controversial that the topic has become a sign of political identity in these countries. This is not bad news but a symptom of democratic vitality; however, sometimes intense debates focus so much on a few issues that other ones are sidelined. We want to make two recommendations on the grounds that all public subsidies should be delivered in the same general conditions. Drawing on this principle, which should affect education as well as civil construction and the management of water or electricity, the struggle observed in our two case studies reminds us of two aspects. On the one hand, private-dependent schools only select their intake in some countries, while this option is forbidden in other ones. To what extent is it legitimate that these institutions select their students if they are supported by the state? On the other hand, if the budget of these schools was published, and therefore was better known, it would be much easier to estimate their needs and the relative weight of public subsidies in their whole income. So, democratic debates could really advance if new diagnoses and proposals on admission and budgeting appeared and were disseminated in Spain and Chile.