A few bad apples are enough: an agent-based peer review game
Cabotà, Juan (Universitat de València. Departament d'Informàtica)
Grimaldo, Francisco (Universitat de València. Departament d'Informàtica)
Cadavid, Lorena (Universidad Nacional de Colombia)
Bravo, Giangiacomo (Linnaeus University)
Squazzoni, Flaminio (University of Brescia)

Date:	2014
Abstract:	Following previous agent-based research on peer review, this paper presents a game theory-inspired model that looks at peer review as a cooperation dilemma. We tested different scientist behaviours and network topologies in order to understand their implications on the quality, efficiency and type of resource distribution in the science system. We tested random, scale-free and small world networks connecting scientists and three types of referee behaviour: self-interested (providing unreliable opinion), normative referees (providing reliable opinion) and conformist reviewers (conforming to other referees' behaviour). Preliminary results indicate that differences in the combination of referee behaviour have significant impact on the quality of the process and that the percentage of conformists is one of the most crucial model parameters.
Rights:	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Comunicació de congrés
Subject:	Peer review game ; Computational social science ; Social simulation
Published in:	Social Simulation Conference. Bellaterra, Cerdanyola del Valles, 1a : 2014

Podeu consultar la compilació de les ponències presentades a Social Simulation Conference a: https://ddd.uab.cat/record/125597

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Contributions to meetings and congresses > Papers and communications > UAB papers and communications