Efficient and stable collective choices under crowding preferences
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Nicolò, Antonio (Università di Padova. Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche)
Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica

Imprint:	[S.l.] : Centre de Referencia en Economia Analítica, 2004
Description:	29 p.
Abstract:	We consider a set of agents who have to choose one alternative among a finite set of social alternatives. A final allocation is a pair given by the selected alternative and the group of its users. Agents have crowding preferences over allocations: between any pair of allocations with the same alternative, they prefer the allocation with the largest number of users. We require that a decision be efficient and stable (which guarantees free participation in the group of users and free exit from it). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property. The social choice function implemented by the proposed mechanism is also anonymous and group stable.
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Language:	Anglès
Series:	Barcelona economics working papers series; 148
Document:	Working paper
Subject:	Béns públics ; Public goods ; Crowding preferences ; Subgame perfect implementation

Adreça alternativa: https://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/148.pdf

29 p, 310.9 KB

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