Efficient and stable collective choices under crowding preferences
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Nicolò, Antonio (Università di Padova. Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche)
Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica

Imprint: [S.l.] : Centre de Referencia en Economia Analítica, 2004
Description: 29 p.
Abstract: We consider a set of agents who have to choose one alternative among a finite set of social alternatives. A final allocation is a pair given by the selected alternative and the group of its users. Agents have crowding preferences over allocations: between any pair of allocations with the same alternative, they prefer the allocation with the largest number of users. We require that a decision be efficient and stable (which guarantees free participation in the group of users and free exit from it). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property. The social choice function implemented by the proposed mechanism is also anonymous and group stable.
Rights: Tots els drets reservats
Language: Anglès.
Series: Barcelona economics working papers series; 148
Document: workingPaper
Subject: Béns públics ; Public goods ; Crowding preferences ; Subgame perfect implementation

Adreça alternativa: https://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/148.pdf

29 p, 310.9 KB

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Research literature > Working papers

 Record created 2015-10-08, last modified 2019-02-03

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