Catchment areas and access to better schools
Calsamiglia, Caterina
Miralles, Antonio (Miralles Asensio)
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics

Publicació: Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, 2014
Descripció: 27 p.
Resum: We compare popular school choice mechanisms in terms of children's access to better schools (ABS) than their catchment area school, in districts with school stratification and where priority is given for residence in the catchment area of the school. In a large market model with two good schools and one bad school, we calculate worst-case and best-case bounds of the Boston Mechanism (BM). We find that both BM and DA convey a non-negligible risk that catchment area priority fully determines the final assignment regardless parents' preferences. Top-Trading Cycles is an alternative that provides more access to better schools than DA.
Drets: Tots els drets reservats
Llengua: Anglès
Col·lecció: Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series; 631
Document: workingPaper
Matèria: Escoles ; Elecció ; Models matemàtics ; Priorities ; Bad school ; School choice

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27 p, 436.4 KB

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