Web of Science: 1 citations, Scopus: 2 citations, Google Scholar: citations
Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica)
Nicolò, Antonio (Università di Padova)

Date: 2008
Abstract: We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.
Note: We are grateful to two anonymous referees for their thoughtful comments and suggestions that greatly improved the paper. We have also received very useful comments from Pablo Amorós, Carmen Beviá, Sandro Brusco, Luis Corchón, Humberto Llavador, Bernardo Moreno, David Pérez-Castrillo, Socorro Puy, Joaquim Silvestre, Marc Vorsatz, and Ashel Wolinsky. The work of Massó is partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science through grant SEJ2005-01481/ECON and FEDER and through project CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010 (CDS2006-00016), and by the Generalitat de Catalunya through grant SGR2005-00454 and through the Barcelona Economics Program (CREA). The work of Nicolò is partially supported by the Italian Ministry of University and Research through grant 2005137858
Note: Número d'acord de subvenció MEC/SEJ2005-01481/ECON
Note: Número d'acord de subvenció CDS2006-00016
Note: Número d'acord de subvenció SGR2005-00454
Rights: Tots els drets reservats
Language: Anglès.
Document: article ; recerca ; submittedVersion
Subject: Béns públics ; Public goods ; Gregarious preferences ; Subgame perfect implementation
Published in: Games and economic behavior, Vol. 64 Núm. 2 (November 2008) , p. 591-611, ISSN 0899-8256

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.007


Preprint
34 p, 285.9 KB

The record appears in these collections:
Articles > Research articles
Articles > Published articles

 Record created 2015-11-25, last modified 2019-02-03



   Favorit i Compartir