Behavioral regulatory agencies
Trillas, Francesc (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia Aplicada)

Imprint: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia Aplicada, 2016
Description: 40 p.
Abstract: This article analyses how the commitment problem in regulation, and the potential for a strategic delegation solution, is affected by the consideration of bounded rationality by agents that participate in the regulatory interaction. Regulators and other agents have endogenous preferences. Non-optimizing behavior, expert biases (and related de-biasing strategies), and a concern for fairness and process also modify the traditional regulatory game. As a result, on the one hand independent regulators are seen as part of a potentially more robust regulatory system, and on the other hand their contribution to this system can be based on a wider range of instruments.
Rights: Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades. Creative Commons
Language: Anglès
Series: Departament d'Economia Aplicada. Documents de treball
Series: Document de treball (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia Aplicada) ; 1606
Document: Working paper
Subject: Raonament pràctic ; Models matemàtics ; Planificacio estratègica ; Delegation ; Commitment ; Regulation ; Bounded rationality



43 p, 394.6 KB

The record appears in these collections:
Research literature > Working papers > Department of Applied Economics. Working papers

 Record created 2016-06-13, last modified 2024-05-19



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