Behavioral regulatory agencies
Trillas, Francesc (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia Aplicada)

Imprint:	Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia Aplicada, 2016
Description:	40 p.
Abstract:	This article analyses how the commitment problem in regulation, and the potential for a strategic delegation solution, is affected by the consideration of bounded rationality by agents that participate in the regulatory interaction. Regulators and other agents have endogenous preferences. Non-optimizing behavior, expert biases (and related de-biasing strategies), and a concern for fairness and process also modify the traditional regulatory game. As a result, on the one hand independent regulators are seen as part of a potentially more robust regulatory system, and on the other hand their contribution to this system can be based on a wider range of instruments.
Rights:	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades.
Language:	Anglès
Series:	Departament d'Economia Aplicada. Documents de treball
Series:	Document de treball (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia Aplicada) ; 1606
Document:	Working paper
Subject:	Raonament pràctic ; Models matemàtics ; Planificacio estratègica ; Delegation ; Commitment ; Regulation ; Bounded rationality

43 p, 394.6 KB

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Research literature > Working papers > Department of Applied Economics. Working papers