Behavioral regulatory agencies
Trillas, Francesc (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia Aplicada)
Imprint: |
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia Aplicada, 2016 |
Description: |
40 p. |
Abstract: |
This article analyses how the commitment problem in regulation, and the potential for a strategic delegation solution, is affected by the consideration of bounded rationality by agents that participate in the regulatory interaction. Regulators and other agents have endogenous preferences. Non-optimizing behavior, expert biases (and related de-biasing strategies), and a concern for fairness and process also modify the traditional regulatory game. As a result, on the one hand independent regulators are seen as part of a potentially more robust regulatory system, and on the other hand their contribution to this system can be based on a wider range of instruments. |
Rights: |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades. |
Language: |
Anglès |
Series: |
Departament d'Economia Aplicada. Documents de treball |
Series: |
Document de treball (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia Aplicada) ; 1606 |
Document: |
Working paper |
Subject: |
Raonament pràctic ;
Models matemàtics ;
Planificacio estratègica ;
Delegation ;
Commitment ;
Regulation ;
Bounded rationality |
The record appears in these collections:
Research literature >
Working papers >
Department of Applied Economics. Working papers
Record created 2016-06-13, last modified 2024-05-19