Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information
Clippel, Geoffroy de (Brown University)
Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Wettstein, David (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)

Date:	2012
Abstract:	We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were un-der complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.
Grants:	Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2009-07616 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2009SGR-169
Note:	We thank two referees for their comments and suggestions. Geoffroy de Clippel gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the National Science Foundation (grant SES-0851210). David Wettstein gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the Israeli Science Foundation and the Pinchas Sapir Center for Development in Tel Aviv University. David Pérez-Castrillo gratefully acknowledges the financial support from projects 2009-0761ECON, 2009SGR-169, Barcelona Economics Program and ICREA Academia. David Pérez-Castrillo is a research fellow of MOVE
Note:	Altres ajuts: SES-0851210
Rights:	Tots els drets reservats.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió acceptada per publicar
Subject:	Pareto Efficiency ; Egalitarian Equivalence ; Asymmetric Information
Published in:	Games and economic behavior, Vol. 75, Num. 1 (2012) , p. 413-423, ISSN 0899-8256

Podeu consultar la versió working paper a: http://ddd.uab.es/record/60887
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.005

Postprint 20 p, 607.8 KB

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