Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information
Clippel, Geoffroy de (Brown University)
Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia)
Wettstein, David (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)

Fecha: 2012
Resumen: We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were un-der complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.
Nota: We thank two referees for their comments and suggestions. Geoffroy de Clippel gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the National Science Foundation (grant SES-0851210). David Wettstein gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the Israeli Science Foundation and the Pinchas Sapir Center for Development in Tel Aviv University. David Pérez-Castrillo gratefully acknowledges the financial support from projects 2009-0761ECON, 2009SGR-169, Barcelona Economics Program and ICREA Academia. David Pérez-Castrillo is a research fellow of MOVE
Nota: Número d'acord de subvenció SES-0851210
Nota: Número d'acord de subvenció MINECO/ECO2009-07616
Nota: Número d'acord de subvenció AGAUR/2009SGR-169
Derechos: Tots els drets reservats.
Lengua: Anglès.
Documento: article ; recerca ; acceptedVersion
Materia: Pareto Efficiency ; Egalitarian Equivalence ; Asymmetric Information
Publicado en: Games and economic behavior, Vol. 75, Num. 1 (2012) , p. 413-423, ISSN 0899-8256

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