Reputational concerns with altruistic providers
Olivella, Pau (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Siciliani, Luigi (University of York. Department of Economics and Related Studies)

Date:	2017
Abstract:	We study a model of reputational concerns when doctors differ in their degree of altruism and they can signal their altruism by their (observable) quality. When reputational concerns are high, following the introduction or enhancement of public reporting, the less altruistic (bad) doctor mimics the more altruistic (good) doctor. Otherwise, either a separating or a semi-separating equilibrium arises: the bad doctor mimics the good doctor with probability less than one. Pay-for-performance incentive schemes are unlikely to induce crowding out, unless some dimensions of quality are unobservable. Under the pooling equilibrium a purchaser can implement the first-best quality by appropriately choosing a simple payment scheme with a fixed price per unit of quality provided. This is not the case under the separating equilibrium. Therefore, policies that enhance public reporting complement pay-for-performance schemes.
Grants:	Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad SEV-2015-05 Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia ECO2015-63679
Rights:	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió acceptada per publicar
Subject:	Altruisme ; Reputació ; Reputation ; Altruism ; Doctors ; Name and shame policies ; Pay for performance
Published in:	Journal of health economics, 2017 , ISSN 0167-6296

DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.05.003

Postprint 34 p, 1.7 MB

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