Consciousness regained? Philosophical arguments for and against reductive physicalism
Sturm, Thomas 1967- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament de Filosofia)

Date:	2012
Abstract:	This paper is an overview of recent discussions concerning the mind-body problem, which is being addressed at the interface between philosophy and neuroscience. It focuses on phenomenal features of consciousness or "qualia," which are distinguished from various related issues. Then follows a discussion of various influential skeptical arguments that question the possibility of reductive explanations of qualia in physicalist terms: knowledge arguments, conceivability arguments, the argument of multiple realizability, and the explanatory gap argument. None of the arguments is found to be very convincing. It does not necessarily follow that reductive physicalism is the only option, but it is defensible. However, constant conceptual and methodological reflection is required, alongside ongoing research, to keep such a view free from dogmatism and naivety.
Grants:	Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación FFI 200801559-FISO
Rights:	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades.
Language:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Subject:	Consciousness ; Philosophy of mind ; Qualia ; Reductionism ; Knowledge
Published in:	Dialogues in clinical neuroscience, Vol. 14 (march 2012) , p. 55-63, ISSN 1958-5969

PMID: 22577305

9 p, 723.1 KB

The record appears in these collections:
Articles > Research articles
Articles > Published articles