Worker turnover and unemployment insurance
Choi, Sekyu (University of Bristol)
Fernández-Blanco, Javier (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Data:	2018
Resum:	This article studies a competitive search model of the labor market with learning about match-specific productivity in which risk-averse workers factor present and future unemployment risks in their search decisions. We examine internally efficient equilibrium allocations in which match termination occurs only if the joint value of a worker-firm pair is negative. Internal efficiency poses a trade-off between present and future risks. Public insurance provision also affects this trade-off and, hence, worker turnover and job composition. In addition to unemployment benefits, the implementation of the planner's allocation requires a negative income tax and a 0 layoff tax.
Ajuts:	Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2012-32392 Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad SEV-2011-0075 Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología ECO 2013-46395 Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología ECO2015-67602-P Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad SEV-2015-0563
Drets:	Tots els drets reservats.
Llengua:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió acceptada per publicar
Matèria:	Labor market ; Public insurance provision ; Worker turnover
Publicat a:	International economic review, Vol. 59, Núm. 4 (November 2018) , p. 1837-1876, ISSN 0020-6598

DOI: 10.1111/iere.12322

Postprint 67 p, 714.4 KB

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