| Fecha: |
2018 |
| Resumen: |
This paper proposes and characterises a new normative solution concept for Kydland and Prescott problems, allowing for a commitment device. A policy choice is dominated if either (a) an alternative exists that is superior to it in a time-consistent subdomain of the constraint set, or (b) an alternative exists that Pareto-dominates it over time. Policies may be time-consistently undominated where time-consistent optimality is not possible. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for this to be true, and show that these are equivalent to a straightforward but significant change to the first-order conditions that apply under Ramsey policy. Time-consistently undominated policies are an order of magnitude simpler than Ramsey choice, whilst retaining normative appeal. This is illustrated across a range of examples. |
| Resumen: |
The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396. |
| Ayudas: |
European Commission 649396
|
| Derechos: |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, fins i tot amb finalitats comercials, sempre i quan es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original.  |
| Lengua: |
Anglès |
| Colección: |
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics. ADEMU working paper series |
| Colección: |
ADEMU Working Paper Series ; 82 |
| Documento: |
Working paper |
| Materia: |
Time consistency ;
Undominated policy ;
Ramsey policy |
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