Individualism-collectivism, governance and economic development
Kyriacou, Andreas P.. (Universitat de Girona. Departament d'Economia)

Data:	2015
Descripció:	29 pag.
Resum:	While an individualist society prizes personal control, autonomy and individual accomplishments, a collectivist society puts a premium on loyalty and cohesion and imposes mutual obligations in the context of in-groups. It has been argued that individualism will promote economic development directly by sharpening individual incentives to invest, innovate and accumulate wealth. In this article, I argue that the individualist-collectivist dimension can also affect development through its impact on governance. The in-group favoritism inherent to collectivist societies is likely to engender corruption, nepotism and clientelism in the public sphere. In individualist societies, the relative weakness of in-group pressures and an emphasis on personal achievement and worth will contribute towards a more meritocratic and efficient public sector. My empirical evidence confirms the strong positive relationship between individualism and government quality. Moreover, I provide robust empirical evidence showing that the expected direct positive impact of individualism on economic development disappears when additionally controlling for governance, a finding which suggests that insofar as individualism affects development it does so because it promotes good governance.
Ajuts:	Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación ECO2010-21668-C03-02 Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2014/SGR-239
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Llengua:	Anglès
Col·lecció:	MPRA Paper ; 65151
Document:	Working paper
Matèria:	Culture ; Individualism ; Collectivism ; In-group favoritism ; Governance ; Economic development

Adreça alternativa: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/65151/

29 p, 542.9 KB

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