Monetary commitment and fiscal discretion : the optimal policy mix
Gnocchi, Stefano (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)

Fecha:	2013
Resumen:	We study a noncooperative policy game between monetary and fiscal policy, where only monetary policy can commit to future actions. The equilibrium outcome of the game depends on the strategies available to the monetary policymaker. If strategies are left unrestricted, the central bank can alter the incentives of the fiscal authority in a way that replicates the full commitment solution. If the central bank cannot commit to respond to fiscal policy, the fiscal authority generates fluctuations in government expenditure that undermine the stabilization goals of the central bank.
Ayudas:	Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad ECO2012-32392
Derechos:	Tots els drets reservats.
Lengua:	Anglès
Documento:	Article ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Materia:	General Aggregative Models ; Keynes ; Keynesian ; Post-Keynesian ; Macroeconomics ; Production ; Price Level ; Inflation ; Deflation ; Monetary Policy ; Central Banks and Their Policies ; Fiscal Policy
Publicado en:	American economic journal. Macroeconomics, Vol. 5 Núm. 2 (2013) , p. 187-216, ISSN 1945-7715

DOI: 10.1257/mac.5.2.187

30 p, 1.0 MB

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