Choosing the crook : a conjoint experiment on voting for corrupt politicians
Breitenstein, Sofia (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)

Fecha:	2019
Resumen:	The coexistence of harsh disapproval of corruption and the limited electoral consequences of malfeasant behavior remains a conundrum in social sciences. While elections should be used to hold politicians accountable, evidence shows that voters only mildly punish corrupt politicians. This paper assesses the trade-off hypothesis, which suggests that voters forgive corrupt candidates when these candidates provide other valued outcomes. It distinguishes two possible factors against which integrity can be traded-partisanship and economic performance-and tests them in a multidimensional experiment. With the results of an original conjoint analysis, this paper provides compelling evidence for the relative importance of corruption when casting a vote and the mitigating effects of other valued candidate characteristics. Even when obtaining highly credible information, partisanship determines the vote to the same extent as corruption. Additionally, co-partisanship and a strong economic performance moderate the negative effect corruption has on the vote.
Ayudas:	Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad BES-2015-072756 European Commission 613237
Derechos:	Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, la comunicació pública de l'obra i la creació d'obres derivades, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original.
Lengua:	Anglès
Documento:	Article ; recerca ; Versió publicada
Materia:	Corruption ; Voting ; Experiment ; Partisanship ; Economic performance
Publicado en:	Research and Politics, Vol. 6 Núm. 1 (gener 2019) , ISSN 2053-1680

DOI: 10.1177/2053168019832230

8 p, 145.9 KB

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